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The main purpose of this paper is to show that the conflict between the considerations 
involving economic efficiency and those of distributive justice, in the context of 
assigning liability, is not as sharp as is generally believed to be the case. The condition of 
negligence liability which characterizes efficiency in the context of liability rules has an 
all-or-none character. Negligence liability requires that if one party is negligent and the 
other is not then the liability for the entire accident loss must fall on the negligent party. 
Thus within the framework of standard liability rules efficiency requirements preclude 
any non-efficiency considerations in cases where one party is negligent and the other is 
not. In this paper it is shown that a part of accident loss plays no part in providing 
appropriate incentives to the parties for taking due care and can therefore be apportioned 
on non-efficiency considerations. For a systematic analysis of efficiency requirements, a 
notion more general than that of a liability rule, namely, that of a decomposed liability 
rule is introduced. A complete characterization of efficient decomposed liability rules is 
provided in the paper. One important implication of the characterization theorems of this 
paper is that by decomposing accident loss in two parts, the scope for distributive 
considerations can be significantly broadened without sacrificing economic efficiency. 
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JEL Classification: K13 Considerations relating to the eﬃciency of liability rules have occupied an important
place in the law and economics literature right from its inception. The pioneering contri-
bution by Calabresi (1961) analyzed the eﬀect of liability rules on parties’ behaviour. In
his seminal contribution Coase (1960) looked at liability rules from the point of view of
their implications for social costs. The rule of negligence was analyzed by Posner (1972)
from the perspective of economic eﬃciency. The ﬁrst formal analysis of liability rules
was done by Brown (1973). His main results demonstrated the eﬃciency of both the rule
of negligence and the rule of strict liability with the defense of contributory negligence.
Formal treatment of some of the most important results of the extensive literature on lia-
bility rules is contained in Landes and Posner (1987), Shavell (1987), and Miceli (1997). A
complete characterization of eﬃcient liability rules is contained in Jain and Singh (2002).
In the literature dealing with the question of eﬃciency of liability rules, the problem
has generally been considered within the framework of accidents resulting from interaction
of two risk-neutral parties, the victim and the injurer. The social goal is taken to be the
minimization of total social costs, which are deﬁned to be the sum of costs of care taken by
the two parties and expected accident loss. The probability of accident and the amount of
loss in case of occurrence of accident are assumed to depend on the levels of care taken by
the two parties. A party is called nonnegligent if its care level is at least equal to the due
care level; otherwise it is called negligent. A liability rule determines the proportions in
which the two parties are to bear the loss in case of occurrence of accident as a function of
whether and by what proportion the parties involved in the interaction are negligent. A
liability rule is eﬃcient if it invariably induces both parties to behave in ways which result
in socially optimal outcomes, i.e., outcomes under which total social costs are minimized.
The central result regarding the eﬃciency question that has emerged is that a liability
rule is eﬃcient if and only if it satisﬁes the condition of negligence liability. The condition
of negligence liability requires that (i) if the victim is nonnegligent and the injurer is
negligent then the entire loss, in case of occurrence of accident, must be borne by the
injurer; and (ii) if the injurer is nonnegligent and the victim is negligent then the entire
loss, in case of occurrence of accident, must be borne by the victim.
The condition of negligence liability, which has an all-or-none character, completely
speciﬁes the assignment of liability shares in cases where one party is negligent and the
other is not. Consequently, it would seem that if the choice of a liability rule is to be
from the set of eﬃcient liability rules then the non-eﬃciency considerations, including
distributive and restitutive considerations, cannot possibly play any role in assigning
liability in cases where one party is negligent and the other is not. Other considerations
at best can have a role only in situations when either both parties are negligent or both
are nonnegligent.
If liabilities of the parties are to be speciﬁed as proportions of total accident loss, as is
1done in tort law, then what has been said above about eﬃciency considerations precluding
other considerations in cases where one party is negligent and the other nonnegligent is
indeed correct. But if one is willing to go outside the traditional tort law framework then it
turns out that the scope for non-eﬃciency considerations is much greater than is generally
thought to be the case. In providing correct incentives to the parties, part of accident loss,
equal to the optimal loss when both parties are taking the due care, suitably adjusted
to take into account diﬀering probabilities of accident with diﬀerent care levels, seems to
play no role and can therefore be apportioned between the two parties independently of
their care levels. It is the apportionment of the accident loss over and above the adjusted
optimal loss which turns out to be crucial from the point of view of providing correct
incentives to the parties. An example may help illustrate the point.
Consider a two-party interaction in which the accident occurs with certainty; but the
magnitude of accident loss depends on the care levels of the parties. Let the loss be 100
if neither party takes care, 98.5 if one party takes care and the other does not, and 97
if both parties take care. Let taking care by either party cost 1. As the rule of strict
liability with the defense of contributory negligence is an eﬃcient liability rule, it would
induce in the context of the scenario of this example both the parties to take care and
thus lead to the socially optimal outcome. It can easily be checked that the rule would
lead to the socially optimal outcome of both parties taking care even if part of the loss
equal to the optimal loss, which is 97 here, is assigned to the injurer regardless of the care
levels of the two parties.
This example makes it clear that the eﬃciency requirement does not preclude alto-
gether a role for distributive considerations even when one party is negligent and the
other is not. In principle, part of the accident loss can be assigned between the parties
purely on non-eﬃciency considerations without aﬀecting the eﬃciency property. For a
systematic treatment of this question the notion of a liability rule needs to be generalized
so that all possible decompositions of accident loss could be considered to ﬁnd out the
precise constraints imposed by the eﬃciency requirement.
A liability rule apportions the accident loss between the parties as a function of whether
and by what proportions the two parties are nonnegligent. Corresponding to any liability
rule one can deﬁne a two-parameter family of rules in the following way: (i) A speciﬁed
multiple (θ) of adjusted optimal loss is to be assigned between the two parties in ﬁxed
proportions (λ,1 − λ) (ii) The remainder of the loss is to be apportioned between the
two parties as speciﬁed by the liability rule in question as a function of proportions of
nonnegligence of the parties. This more general notion of a rule would be called a (λ,θ)-
decomposed liability rule. For θ = 0 the two notions coincide. We show that if 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1
then the decomposed liability rule is eﬃcient if and only if the corresponding liability rule
is eﬃcient. If θ > 1 then it turns out that no decomposed liability rule can be eﬃcient.
2In other words, eﬃciency properties remain unaﬀected provided the quantum of loss that
is assigned independently of care levels does not exceed adjusted optimal loss. Regardless
of whether a decomposed liability rule corresponds to an eﬃcient liability rule or an
ineﬃcient liability rule, if θ > 1 then the decomposed liability rule would be ineﬃcient.
In view of these results it is clear that it is the amount of loss that is in excess of the
adjusted optimal loss which constitutes the irreducible minimum which must be assigned
to the negligent party to ensure eﬃciency, in cases where one party is negligent and the
other is not. Thus the requirements imposed by eﬃciency considerations could be quite
mild depending on the context.
The paper is divided in two sections. The ﬁrst section sets out the framework of
analysis and introduces the notion of a decomposed liability rule. The next section shows
that, given 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1, a (λ,θ)-decomposed liability rule is eﬃcient if and only if it satisﬁes
the condition of negligence liability. It is also shown that for θ > 1 every (λ,θ)-decomposed
liability rule is ineﬃcient.
1 Deﬁnitions and Assumptions
We consider accidents resulting from interaction of two parties, assumed to be strangers
to each other, in which, to begin with, the entire loss falls on one party to be called the
victim (plaintiﬀ). The other party would be referred to as the injurer (defendant). We
denote by a ≥ 0 the index of the level of care taken by the victim; and by b ≥ 0 the index
of the level of care taken by the injurer.
Let
A = {a | a ≥ 0 is the index of some feasible level of care which can be taken by the
victim}, and
B = {b | b ≥ 0 is the index of some feasible level of care which can be taken by the
injurer}.
We assume:
0 ∈ A ∧ 0 ∈ B. (A1)
We denote by c(a) the cost to the victim of care level a and by d(b) the cost to the injurer
of care level b.
Let C = {c(a) | a ∈ A}, and D = {d(b) | b ∈ B}.
We assume:
c(0) = 0 ∧ d(0) = 0. (A2)
We also assume that c and d are strictly increasing functions of a and b respectively.
(A3)
In view of (A2) and (A3) it follows that:
3(∀c ∈ C)(c ≥ 0) ∧ (∀d ∈ D)(d ≥ 0).
A consequence of (A3) is that c and d themselves can be taken as indices of levels of care
of the two parties.
Let Π denote the probability of occurrence of accident and H ≥ 0 the loss in case
of occurrence of accident. Both Π and H will be assumed to be functions of c and d;
Π = Π(c,d),H = H(c,d). Let L = ΠH. L is thus the expected loss due to accident.
We assume:
(∀c,c0 ∈ C)(∀d,d0 ∈ D)[[c > c0 → L(c,d) ≤ L(c0,d)] ∧ [d > d0 → L(c,d) ≤ L(c,d0)]].
(A4)
In other words, it is assumed that a larger expenditure on care by either party, given
the expenditure on care by the other party, results in lesser or equal expected accident
loss.
Total social costs (TSC) are deﬁned to be the sum of cost of care by the victim, cost
of care by the injurer, and the expected loss due to accident; TSC = c + d + L(c,d). Let
M = {(c0,d0) ∈ C×D | c0+d0+L(c0,d0) is minimum of {c+d+L(c,d) | c ∈ C ∧ d ∈ D}}.
Thus M is the set of all costs of care conﬁgurations (c0,d0) which are total social cost
minimizing. It will be assumed that:
C,D and L are such that M is nonempty. (A5)
Let I denote the closed unit interval[0,1]1. Given C,D,Π,H and (c∗,d∗) ∈ M, we
deﬁne functions p and q as follows:
p : C 7→ I by:
p(c) = 1 if c ≥ c∗
= c
c∗ if c < c∗;
q : D 7→ I by:
q(d) = 1 if d ≥ d∗
= d
d∗ if d < d∗.
In case there is a legally binding due care level for the plaintiﬀ, it would be taken to
be identical with c∗ ﬁguring in the deﬁnition of function p; and in case there is a legally
binding due care level for the defendant, it would be taken to be identical with d∗ ﬁguring
in the deﬁnition of function q. Thus implicitly it is being assumed that the legally binding
due care levels are always set appropriately from the point of view of minimizing total
social costs.
1In addition to denoting the set {x | 0 ≤ x ≤ 1} by [0,1], we use the following standard notation to
denote:
by [0,1) the set {x | 0 ≤ x < 1},
by (0,1] the set {x | 0 < x ≤ 1}, and
by (0,1) the set {x | 0 < x < 1}.
4p and q would be interpreted as proportions of nonnegligence of the victim and the
injurer respectively. (1 − p) and (1 − q) consequently would denote the proportions of
negligence of the victim and the injurer respectively.
Let λ ∈ [0,1] and θ ≥ 0. Denote H(c∗,d∗),Π(c∗,d∗) and L(c∗,d∗) by H∗,Π∗ and L∗
respectively.
Deﬁne functions S and G as follows:
S(c,d) = H(c,d) − θH∗ Π∗
Π(c,d) if Π(c,d) 6= 0 ∧ H(c,d) > θH∗ Π∗
Π(c,d)
= 0 otherwise.
G(c,d) = θH∗ Π∗
Π(c,d) if S(c,d) > 0
= H(c,d) if S(c,d) = 0.
Let R(c,d) = Π(c,d)S(c,d) and F(c,d) = Π(c,d)G(c,d).
In other words,
R(c,d) = L(c,d) − θL∗ if L(c,d) > θL∗
= 0 otherwise.
F(c,d) = θL∗ if L(c,d) > θL∗
= L(c,d) if L(c,d) ≤ θL∗.
Thus,
R(c,d) = max{L(c,d) − θL∗, 0}
F(c,d) = min{L(c,d), θL∗}.
G(c,d) will be referred to as the speciﬁed multiple of the adjusted optimal loss; and
S(c,d) will be called the excess loss. Consistent with this nomenclature, F(c,d) will
be referred to as the speciﬁed multiple of the expected optimal loss; and R(c,d) as the
expected excess loss.
A liability rule is a rule which speciﬁes the proportions in which the two parties are to
bear the loss in case of occurrence of accident as a function of proportions of two parties’
nonnegligence. Formally, a liability rule is a function f from I2 to I2, f : I2 7→ I2, such
that: f(p,q) = (x,y), where x + y = 1.
A (λ,θ) - decomposed liability rule is a rule which speciﬁes the proportions in which
the two parties are to bear the excess loss in case of occurrence of accident as a function
of proportions of two parties’ nonnegligence; and assigns speciﬁed multiple of adjusted
optimal loss in the (λ,1 − λ) proportions to the victim and the injurer respectively.
Formally, a (λ,θ) - decomposed liability rule is a function f from I2 to I2, f : I2 7→ I2,
such that: f(p,q) = (x,y) = [x(p,q),y(p,q)], where x + y = 1.
Let C,D,Π,H and (c∗,d∗) ∈ M be given. If accident takes place and loss of H(c,d)
materializes, then xS(c,d) + λG(c,d) will be borne by the victim and yS(c,d) + (1 −
λ)G(c,d) by the injurer. As, to begin with, in case of occurrence of accident, the entire
loss falls upon the victim, yS(c,d) + (1 − λ)G(c,d) represents the liability payment by
5the injurer to the victim. The expected costs of the victim and the injurer, to be denoted
by EC1 and EC2 respectively, therefore, are [c + xR(c,d) + λF(c,d)] and [d + yR(c,d) +
(1−λ)F(c,d)] respectively. Both parties are assumed to prefer smaller expected costs to
larger expected costs and be indiﬀerent between alternatives with equal expected costs.
Remark 1 The notion of a (λ,θ) - decomposed liability rule is a generalization of the
notion of a liability rule. For θ = 0, the deﬁnition of a (λ,θ) - decomposed liability rule
reduces to that of a liability rule.
It should be noted that for every liability rule there corresponds a class of (λ,θ) -
decomposed liability rules. The class corresponding to liability rule f is given by: {g | g
is a (λ,θ) - decomposed liability rule, λ ∈ [0,1],θ ≥ 0,(∀p,q ∈ [0,1])[g(p,q) = f(p,q)]}.
Let f be a (λ,θ) - decomposed liability rule. An application of f consists of spec-
iﬁcation of C,D,Π,H and (c∗,d∗) ∈ M satisfying (A1) - (A5). f is deﬁned to be ef-
ﬁcient for a given application C,D,Π,H and (c∗,d∗) ∈ M satisfying (A1) - (A5) iﬀ
(∀(c,d) ∈ C ×D)[(c,d) is a Nash equilibrium → (c,d) ∈ M] and (∃(c,d) ∈ C ×D)[(c,d)
is a Nash equilibrium].2 f is deﬁned to be eﬃcient iﬀ it is eﬃcient for every possible
application. In other words, a (λ,θ) - decomposed liability rule is eﬃcient for given
C,D,Π,H and (c∗,d∗) ∈ M satisfying (A1) - (A5) iﬀ (i) every Nash equilibrium is total
social cost minimizing, and (ii) there exists at least one Nash equilibrium. A (λ,θ) -
decomposed liability rule is eﬃcient iﬀ it is eﬃcient for every possible choice of C,D,Π,H
and (c∗,d∗) ∈ M satisfying (A1) - (A5).
Remark 2 It should be noted that if (A5) is not satisﬁed then no (λ,θ) - decomposed
liability rule can be eﬃcient.
To illustrate some of the above ideas we consider below several examples.
Example 1: Let (1
3,1) - decomposed liability rule f be deﬁned by:
(∀p ∈ [0,1])(∀q ∈ [0,1])[f(p,q) = (1
2, 1
2)].
Consider an application of f such that:
C = D = {0,1};
L(0,0) = 9,L(0,1) = L(1,0) = 7.5,L(1,1) = 6.
Here (1,1) is the unique TSC-minimizing conﬁguration of costs of care.
Let(c∗,d∗) = (1,1).
As θL∗ = 6, we obtain:
R(0,0) = 3,R(0,1) = R(1,0) = 1.5,R(1,1) = 0
F(0,0) = F(0,1) = F(1,0) = F(1,1) = 6.
EC1(0,0) = 3.5,EC1(0,1) = 2.75,EC1(1,0) = 3.75,EC1(1,1) = 3;
2Throughout this paper we consider only pure-strategy Nash equilibria.
6EC2(0,0) = 5.5,EC2(0,1) = 5.75,EC2(1,0) = 4.75,EC2(1,1) = 5.
Therefore (0,0) is the only Nash equilibrium. Thus f is ineﬃcient.
Example 2: Let (1
2, 1
2) - decomposed liability rule f be deﬁned by:
(∀p ∈ [0,1))(∀q ∈ [0,1))[f(p,q) = (1
2, 1
2)] ∧ (∀p ∈ [0,1))[f(p,1) = (1,0)] ∧ (∀q ∈
[0,1))[f(1,q) = (0,1)] ∧ [f(1,1) = (1
2, 1
2].
Consider an application of f such that:
C = D = {0,1};
L(0,0) = 10,L(0,1) = L(1,0) = 8.5,L(1,1) = 7.
Let(c∗,d∗) = (1,1), which is the unique TSC-minimizing conﬁguration of costs of care.
As θL∗ = 3.5, we obtain:
R(0,0) = 6.5,R(0,1) = R(1,0) = 5,R(1,1) = 3.5
F(0,0) = F(0,1) = F(1,0) = F(1,1) = 3.5
We have:
EC1(0,0) = 5,EC1(0,1) = 6.75,EC1(1,0) = 2.75,EC1(1,1) = 4.5
EC2(0,0) = 5,EC2(0,1) = 2.75,EC2(1,0) = 6.75,EC2(1,1) = 4.5
Here (1,1) is the only Nash equilibrium. Thus the rule is eﬃcient for the application
considered here.3
Example 3: Let (1
2,2) - decomposed liability rule f be deﬁned by:
(∀p ∈ [0,1))(∀q ∈ [0,1))[f(p,q) = (1
2, 1
2)] ∧ (∀p ∈ [0,1))[f(p,1) = (1,0)] ∧ (∀q ∈
[0,1))[f(1,q) = (0,1)] ∧ [f(1,1) = (1
2, 1
2].
Consider an application of f such that:
C = D = {0,1};
L(0,0) = 10,L(0,1) = L(1,0) = 8.5,L(1,1) = 7.
Let (c∗,d∗) = (1,1), which is the unique TSC-minimizing conﬁguration of costs of care.
As θL∗ = 14, it follows that:
(∀(c,d) ∈ C × D)[R(c,d) = (0,0) ∧ F(c,d) = L(c,d)].
EC1(0,0) = 5,EC1(0,1) = 4.25,EC1(1,0) = 5.25,EC1(1,1) = 4.5
EC2(0,0) = 5,EC2(0,1) = 5.25,EC2(1,0) = 4.25,EC2(1,1) = 4.5
Consequently, (0,0) is the only Nash equilibrium; and thus the rule is ineﬃcient.
Example 4: Let f be a(0,1) - decomposed liability rule deﬁned by:




2) - decomposed liability rule of Example 2 is eﬃcient for every C,D,Π,H and (c∗,d∗) ∈ M
satisfying (A1) - (A5). Eﬃciency of this decomposed liability rule for every application follows from
Theorem 1.
7C = D = {0,1,2};
L(0,0) = 10,L(0,1) = 6,L(0,2) = 5,L(1,0) = 5.5,L(1,1) = 1.5,L(1,2) = .5,L(2,0) =
5,L(2,1) = 1,L(2,2) = 0.
Here M = {(1,1),(1,2)}. Let (c∗,d∗) = (1,1). Hence, L∗ = 1.5
Therefore,
R(0,0) = 8.5,R(0,1) = 4.5,R(0,2) = 3.5,R(1,0) = 4,R(1,1) = 0,R(1,2) = 0,R(2,0) =
3.5,R(2,1) = 0,R(2,2) = 0; and
F(0,0) = F(0,1) = F(0,2) = F(1,0) = F(1,1) = F(2,0) = 1.5,F(1,2) = .5,F(2,1) =
1,F(2,2) = 0.
We have:
EC1(0,0) = 0,EC1(0,1) = 4.5,EC1(0,2) = 3.5,EC1(1,0) = 1,EC1(1,1) = 1,
EC1(1,2) = 1,EC1(2,0) = 2,EC1(2,1) = 2,EC1(2,2) = 2;
EC2(0,0) = 10,EC2(0,1) = 2.5,EC2(0,2) = 3.5,EC2(1,0) = 5.5,EC2(1,1) = 2.5,
EC2(1,2) = 2.5,EC2(2,0) = 5,EC2(2,1) = 2,EC2(2,2) = 2.
Here there are two Nash equilibria, namely, (1,1) and (1,2).
The rule is eﬃcient for the application considered here.4
Example 5: Let (1,1) - decomposed liability rule f be deﬁned by:
(∀p ∈ [0,1))(∀q ∈ [0,1])[f(p,q) = (1,0)] ∧ (∀q ∈ [0,1])[f(1,q) = (0,1)].
Let:
C = {0,1,2},D = {0,1};
L(0,0) = 10,L(0,1) = 6,L(1,0) = 5,L(1,1) = 1,L(2,0) = 4,L(2,1) = 0.
Here M = {(1,1),(2,1)}.
Let(c∗,d∗) = (2,1).
Therefore,
L∗ = 0, and (∀(c,d) ∈ C × D)[R(c,d) = L(c,d) ∧ F(c,d) = 0]; and
EC1(0,0) = 10,EC1(0,1) = 6,EC1(1,0) = 6,EC1(1,1) = 2,EC1(2,0) = 2,EC1(2,1) =
2;
EC2(0,0) = 0,EC2(0,1) = 1,EC2(1,0) = 0,EC2(1,1) = 1,EC2(2,0) = 4,EC2(2,1) = 1.
Here (2,1) is the only Nash equilibrium; and f is eﬃcient for the given application.5
2 Characterization of Eﬃcient Decomposed Liability
Rules
Condition of Negligence Liability (NL): A (λ,θ) - decomposed liability rule f satisﬁes the
condition of negligence liability iﬀ [[∀p ∈ [0,1)][f(p,1) = (1,0)] ∧ [∀q ∈ [0,1)][f(1,q) =
4The rule is eﬃcient for every application.
5This rule is also eﬃcient for every application.
8(0,1)]].
In other words, a decomposed liability rule satisﬁes the condition of negligence liability
iﬀ its structure is such that (i) whenever the injurer is nonnegligent and the victim is
negligent, the entire excess loss in case of accident is borne by the victim, and (ii) whenever
the victim is nonnegligent and the injurer is negligent, the entire excess loss in case of an
accident is borne by the injurer.
Lemma 1 Let 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1. If a (λ,θ) - decomposed liability rule satisﬁes condition NL
then for any arbitrary choice of C,D,Π,H and (c∗,d∗) ∈ M satisfying (A1) - (A5),
(c∗,d∗) is a Nash equilibrium.
Proof: Let f be a (λ,θ) - decomposed liability rule satisfying NL, where 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1. Take
any C,D,Π,H and (c∗,d∗) ∈ M satisfying (A1) - (A5).
Suppose (c∗,d∗) is not a Nash equilibrium. This implies:
(∃c0 ∈ C)[c0+x[p(c0),q(d∗)]R(c0,d∗)+λF(c0,d∗) < c∗+x[p(c∗),q(d∗)]R(c∗,d∗)+λF(c∗,d∗)] ∨
(∃d0 ∈ D)[d0+y[p(c∗),q(d0)]R(c∗,d0)+(1−λ)F(c∗,d0) < d∗+y[p(c∗),q(d∗)]R(c∗,d∗)+(1−
λ)F(c∗,d∗)].
(1.1)
First suppose (∃c0 ∈ C)[c0+x[p(c0),q(d∗)]R(c0,d∗)+λF(c0,d∗) < c∗+x[p(c∗),q(d∗)]R(c∗,d∗)+
λF(c∗,d∗)] holds. (1.2)
We ﬁrst consider the case c0 < c∗.
c0 < c∗ → x[p(c0),q(d∗)] = 1, by condition NL. (1.3)
As (c∗,d∗) ∈ M it follows that:
c0 < c∗ → L(c0,d∗) > L∗
→ L(c0,d∗) − θL∗ > 0, as 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1
→ R(c0,d∗) = L(c0,d∗) − θL∗ ∧ F(c0,d∗) = θL∗. (1.4)
In view of (1.3) and (1.4), (1.2) implies:
c0 + L(c0,d∗) − θL∗ + λθL∗ < c∗ + x1(1 − θ)L∗ + λθL∗, where x1 denotes x(1,1). (1.5)
(1.5) → c0 + d∗ + L(c0,d∗) < c∗ + d∗ + θL∗ + x1(1 − θ)L∗
→ c0 + d∗ + L(c0,d∗) < c∗ + d∗ + L∗, as 0 ≤ x1 ≤ 1.
This is a contradiction as (c∗,d∗) ∈ M, and therefore TSC(c0,d∗) cannot be less than
TSC(c∗,d∗).
This contradiction establishes that c0 < c∗ → (1.2) cannot hold. (1.6)
Next consider the case when c0 > c∗ ∧ L(c0,d∗) > θL∗.
If c0 > c∗ ∧ L(c0,d∗) > θL∗ then (1.2) implies:
c0 + x1[L(c0,d∗) − θL∗] + λθL∗ < c∗ + x1(1 − θ)L∗ + λθL∗
9→ c0 + x1L(c0,d∗) < c∗ + x1L∗
→ (1 − x1)c0 + x1[c0 + d∗ + L(c0,d∗)] < (1 − x1)c∗ + x1[c∗ + d∗ + L∗]
→ (1 − x1)c0 < (1 − x1)c∗, as x1 ≥ 0 and TSC(c0,d∗) ≥ TSC(c∗,d∗). (1.7)
If (1 − x1) > 0 then [(1.7) → c0 < c∗]. (1.8)
If (1 − x1) = 0 then [(1.7) → 0 < 0]. (1.9)
c0 < c∗ contradicts the hypothesis that c0 > c∗ and 0 < 0 is a contradiction. Therefore we
conclude that:
c0 > c∗ ∧ L(c0,d∗) > θL∗ → (1.2) cannot hold. (1.10)
Finally consider the case when c0 > c∗ ∧ L(c0,d∗) ≤ θL∗.
If c0 > c∗ ∧ L(c0,d∗) ≤ θL∗ then (1.2) implies:
c0 + λL(c0,d∗) < c∗ + x1(1 − θ)L∗ + λθL∗. (1.11)
(1.11) → (1 − λ)c0 + λ[c0 + d∗ + L(c0,d∗)] < (1 − λ)c∗ + λ[c∗ + d∗ + L∗]
− λL∗ + x1(1 − θ)L∗ + λθL∗
→ (1 − λ)c0 < (1 − λ)c∗ − λL∗ + x1(1 − θ)L∗ + λθL∗,
as TSC(c0,d∗) ≥ TSC(c∗,d∗) and λ ≥ 0
→ (1 − λ)c0 < (1 − λ)c∗ − λL∗ + (1 − θ)L∗ + λθL∗, as 0 ≤ x1 ≤ 1
→ (1 − λ)c0 < (1 − λ)c∗ + (1 − θ)(1 − λ)L∗ (1.12)
If (1 − λ) = 0 then [(1.12) → 0 < 0, a contradiction]. (1.13)
If (1 − λ) > 0 then [(1.12) → c0 < c∗ + (1 − θ)L∗]. (1.14)
But we have: L∗ − L(c0,d∗) ≤ c0 − c∗, as (c∗,d∗) ∈ M;
and
L(c0,d∗) ≤ θL∗, by hypothesis.
Consequently, L∗ ≤ c0 − c∗ + θL∗
→ c∗ + (1 − θ)L∗ ≤ c0, (1.15)
contradicting c0 < c∗ + (1 − θ)L∗.
In view of (1.13) - (1.15), it follows that:
c0 > c∗ ∧ L(c0,d∗) ≤ θL∗ → (1.2) cannot hold. (1.16)
(1.6), (1.10) and (1.16) establish that (1.2) cannot hold. (1.17)
By an analogous proof one can show that:
(∃d0 ∈ D)[d0+y[p(c∗),q(d0)]R(c∗,d0)+(1−λ)F(c∗,d0) < d∗+y[p(c∗),q(d∗)]R(c∗,d∗)+(1−
λ)F(c∗,d∗)] cannot hold. (1.18)
(1.17) and (1.18) establish the proposition.
Lemma 2 Let 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1. If a (λ,θ) - decomposed liability rule satisﬁes condition NL
then for every possible choice of C,D,Π,H and (c∗,d∗) ∈ M satisfying (A1) - (A5):
10(∀(c,d) ∈ C × D)[(c,d) is a Nash equilibrium → (c,d) ∈ M].
Proof: Let 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1. Let f be a (λ,θ) - decomposed liability rule satisfying NL. Take
any C,D,Π,H and (c∗,d∗) ∈ M satisfying (A1) - (A5).
Let (c,d) be a Nash equilibrium. (c,d) being a Nash equilibrium implies:
(∀c ∈ C)[c + x[p(c),q(d)]R(c,d) + λF(c,d) ≤ c + x[p(c),q(d)]R(c,d) + λF(c,d)] (2.1)
and
(∀d ∈ D)[d+y[p(c),q(d)]R(c,d)+(1−λ)F(c,d) ≤ d+y[p(c),q(d)]R(c,d)+(1−λ)F(c,d)]
(2.2)
(2.1) → [c + x[p(c),q(d)]R(c,d) + λF(c,d) ≤ c∗ + x[p(c∗),q(d)]R(c∗,d) + λF(c∗,d)]
(2.3)
(2.2) → [d + y[p(c),q(d)]R(c,d) + (1 − λ)F(c,d) ≤ d∗ + y[p(c),q(d∗)]R(c,d∗) + (1 −
λ)F(c,d∗)] (2.4)
Adding inequalities (2.3) and (2.4) we obtain:
c+d+R(c,d)+F(c,d) ≤ c∗+d∗+x[p(c∗),q(d)]R(c∗,d)+y[p(c),q(d∗)]R(c,d∗)+λF(c∗,d)+
(1 − λ)F(c,d∗). (2.5)
First we consider the case when c < c∗ ∧ d < d∗.
c < c∗ ∧ d < d∗ → R(c,d) = L(c,d) − θL∗ ∧ F(c,d) = F(c∗,d) = F(c,d∗) = θL∗.
Therefore (2.5) reduces to:
c + d + L(c,d) − θL∗ + θL∗ ≤ c∗ + d∗ + λθL∗ + (1 − λ)θL∗,
as x[p(c∗),q(d)] = 0 ∧ y[p(c),q(d∗)] = 0 by NL
→ c + d + L(c,d) ≤ c∗ + d∗ + θL∗
→ c + d + L(c,d) ≤ c∗ + d∗ + L∗.
As TSC is minimized at (c∗,d∗), it follows that it must be the case that:
c + d + L(c,d) = c∗ + d∗ + L∗
This establishes that:
(c,d) is a Nash equilibrium and c < c∗ ∧ d < d∗ → (c,d) ∈ M. (2.6)
Next we consider the case when c < c∗ ∧ d ≥ d∗.
If c < c∗ ∧ d ≥ d∗, in view of NL, (2.5) reduces to:
c + d + R(c,d) + F(c,d) ≤ c∗ + d∗ + x1R(c∗,d) + λF(c∗,d) + (1 − λ)F(c,d∗). (2.7)
Now, by the deﬁnitions of functions R and F we have:
(∀(c,d) ∈ C × D)[R(c,d) + F(c,d) = L(c,d)].
Therefore (2.7) implies:
c + d + L(c,d) ≤ c∗ + d∗ + x1R(c∗,d) + λF(c∗,d) + (1 − λ)θL∗,
as c < c∗ → F(c,d∗) = θL∗
11→ c + d + L(c,d) ≤ c∗ + d∗ + x1R(c∗,d) + λθL∗ + (1 − λ)θL∗,
as F(c∗,d) ≤ θL∗ by the deﬁnition of function F
→ c + d + L(c,d) ≤ c∗ + d∗ + R(c∗,d) + θL∗ (2.8)
Now, R(c∗,d) + θL∗ = L(c∗,d), if L(c∗,d) > θL∗
= θL∗, if L(c∗,d) ≤ θL∗.
As d ≥ d∗, we have L(c∗,d) ≤ L∗.
Also, θL∗ ≤ L∗, as 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1.
Therefore R(c∗,d) + θL∗ ≤ L∗.
Consequently, (2.8) → c + d + L(c,d) ≤ c∗ + d∗ + L∗.
This establishes that:
(c,d) is a Nash equilibrium ∧ c < c∗ ∧ d ≥ d∗ → (c,d) ∈ M. (2.9)
By an analogous argument it follows that:
(c,d) is a Nash equilibrium ∧ c ≥ c∗ ∧ d < d∗ → (c,d) ∈ M. (2.10)
Finally consider the case when c ≥ c∗ ∧ d ≥ d∗.
If c ≥ c∗ ∧ d ≥ d∗, (2.5) reduces to:
c + d + R(c,d) + F(c,d) ≤ c∗ + d∗ + x1R(c∗,d) + y1R(c,d∗) + λF(c∗,d) +(1 − λ)F(c,d∗),
where y1 = y(1,1).
→ c + d + L(c,d) ≤ c∗ + d∗ + x1R(c∗,d) + y1R(c,d∗) + θL∗, (2.11)
as R(c,d) + F(c,d) = L(c,d),F(c∗,d) ≤ θL∗ and F(c,d∗) ≤ θL∗.
Now, as R(c∗,d) = L(c∗,d) − θL∗, if L(c∗,d) − θL∗ > 0




R(c∗,d) ≤ (1 − θ)L∗. (2.12)
Similarly, R(c,d∗) ≤ (1 − θ)L∗. (2.13)
In view of (2.12) and (2.13), it follows from (2.11) that:
c + d + L(c,d) ≤ c∗ + d∗ + L∗,
which establishes that:
(c,d) is a Nash equilibrium and c ≥ c∗ ∧ d ≥ d∗ → (c,d) ∈ M. (2.14)
(2.6), (2.9,), (2.10) and (2.14) establish the proposition.
Lemma 3 Let 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1. If a (λ,θ) - decomposed liability rule is eﬃcient for every
possible choice of C,D,Π,H and (c∗,d∗) ∈ M satisfying (A1) - (A5), then it satisﬁes
condition NL.
12Proof: Let 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1. Suppose (λ,θ) - decomposed liability rule f violates NL. Then:
[∃p ∈ [0,1)][f(p,1) 6= (1,0)] ∨ [∃q ∈ [0,1)][f(1,q) 6= (0,1)].
Suppose [∃q ∈ [0,1)][f(1,q) 6= (0,1)] holds.
Suppose for q ∈ [0,1) we have:
f(1,q) = (xq,yq),yq 6= 1.
Let t be a positive number. As yq ∈ [0,1), we have yqt < t. Choose a positive number r
such that yqt < r < t.
As q 6= 1,(1 − q) 6= 0. Let d0 = r
1−q
Let 0 < ,0 < c0 and 0 < δ < r − yqt.
Now let C,D and L be speciﬁed as follows:
C = {0,c0,c0 + δ},D = {0,qd0,d0,d0 + δ},
L(0,0) = t+qd0 +c0 ++δ,L(0,qd0) = t+c0 ++δ,L(0,d0) = c0 ++δ,L(0,d0 +δ) =
c0 +  + 1
2δ,
L(c0,0) = t + qd0 + δ,L(c0,qd0) = t + δ,L(c0,d0) = δ,L(c0,d0 + δ) = 1
2δ,
L(c0 +δ,0) = t+qd0 + 1
2δ,L(c0 +δ,qd0) = t+ 1
2δ,L(c0 +δ,d0) = 1
2δ,L(c0 +δ,d0 +δ) = 0.
As  > 0 and t > r = (1 − q)d0, it follows that (c0,d0) is the unique total social cost
minimizing conﬁguration.
Let (c0,d0) = (c∗,d∗).
It should be noted that the above speciﬁcation of C,D,L and (c∗,d∗) ∈ M is consistent
with (A1)- (A5).
Furthermore, the speciﬁcation of L is done in such a way that no inconsistency would
arise even if q = 0.
Now, expected costs of the injurer at (c0,qd0) = EC2(c0,qd0)
= qd0 + yqR(c0,qd0) + (1 − λ)F(c0,qd0)
= qd0 + yq[L(c0,qd0) − θL∗] + (1 − λ)θL∗
= qd0 + yq(t + δ) − yqθδ + (1 − λ)θδ
EC2(c0,d0)
= d0 + y[p(c0),q(d0)]R(c0,d0) + (1 − λ)F(c0,d0)
= d0 + y1(1 − θ)δ + (1 − λ)θδ
EC2(c0,d0) − EC2(c0,qd0)
= d0 + y1(1 − θ)δ + (1 − λ)θδ − qd0 − yq(t + δ) + yqθδ − (1 − λ)θδ
= (r − yqt) + y1(1 − θ)δ − yqδ(1 − θ)
> (r − yqt) + y1(1 − θ)δ − δ
= (r − yqt − δ) + y1(1 − θ)δ > 0.
This establishes that (c0,d0) is not a Nash Equilibrium. Consequently f is not an eﬃcient
(λ,θ) - decomposed liability rule. The proof is completed by noting that, in case [∃p ∈
[0,1)][f(p,1) 6= (1,0)] holds, an analogous argument shows that it is not the case that f
is an eﬃcient (λ,θ) - decomposed liability rule.
13Theorem 1 Let 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1. A (λ,θ) - decomposed liability rule is eﬃcient for every
possible choice of C,D,Π,H and (c∗,d∗) ∈ M satisfying (A1) - (A5) iﬀ it satisﬁes the
condition of negligence liability.
Proof: Let 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1. If a (λ,θ) - decomposed liability rule satisﬁes the condition of
negligence liability then by Propositions 1 and 2 it is eﬃcient for every possible choice
of C,D,Π,H and (c∗,d∗) ∈ M satisfying (A1) - (A5). Proposition 3 establishes that if
a (λ,θ) - decomposed liability rule is eﬃcient for every possible choice of C,D,Π,H and
(c∗,d∗) ∈ M satisfying (A1) - (A5), then it satisﬁes the condition of negligence liability.
Theorem 2 Let f be a (λ,θ) - decomposed liability rule. If θ > 1 then f is not eﬃcient.
Proof: Let f be a (λ,θ) - decomposed liability rule and θ > 1.
Let 0 <  < δ. There exists a positive integer n such that:

nδ < θ − 1.
We consider the following speciﬁcation of C,D and L.
C = D = {0, 
3}.
L(0,0) = nδ + ,L( 
3,0) = L(0, 






3) is the unique total social cost minimizing conﬁguration.
Let (c∗,d∗) = ( 
3, 
3).
Now, nδ +  − θL∗ = nδ +  − θnδ = nδ[1 + 
nδ − θ] < 0.
Therefore, R(0,0) = R( 
3,0) = R(0, 
3) = R( 
3, 
3) = 0.
And therefore, (∀(c,d) ∈ C × D)[F(c,d) = L(c,d)].
We have: λ ≤ 1
2 ∨ 1 − λ ≤ 1
2
First consider the case when λ ≤ 1
2
The expected costs of the victim at ( 
3, 









3) − EC1(0, 
3)
= 







4), as λ ≤ 1
2
> 0.
Thus if λ ≤ 1
2 then the unique total social cost minimizing conﬁguration ( 
3, 
3) is not a
Nash equilibrium.
If 1 − λ ≤ 1
2 then an analogous argument shows that ( 
3, 
3) is not a Nash equilibrium as
the expected costs of the injurer at ( 
3, 
3) are greater than at ( 
3,0).
This establishes that f is not eﬃcient.
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